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Visual awareness is hypothesized to be intimately related to visual working memory
(WM), such that information present in WM is thought to have necessarily been
represented consciously. Recent work has challenged this longstanding view by
demonstrating that visual stimuli rated by observers as unseen can nevertheless be
maintained over a delay period. These experiments have been criticized, however, on
the basis that subjective awareness ratings may contain response bias (e.g., an observer
may report no awareness when in fact they had partial awareness). We mitigated
this issue by investigating WM for visual stimuli that were matched for perceptual
discrimination capacity (d′), yet which varied in subjective confidence ratings (so-called
relative blindsight). If the degree of initial subjective awareness of a stimulus facilitates
later maintenance of that information, WM performance should improve for stimuli
encoded with higher confidence. In contrast, we found that WM performance did not
benefit from higher visual discrimination confidence. This relationship was observed
regardless of WM load (1 or 3). Insofar as metacognitive ratings (e.g., confidence,
visibility) reflect visual awareness, these results challenge a strong relationship between
conscious perception and WM using a paradigm that controls for discrimination
accuracy and is less subject to response bias (since confidence is manipulated within
subjects). Methodologically, we replicate prior efforts to induce relative blindsight using
similar stimulus displays, providing a general framework for isolating metacognitive
awareness in order to examine the function of consciousness.
Keywords: working memory, metacognition, relative blindsight, confidence, perception
INTRODUCTION
When making perceptual decisions, human observers have the capacity to introspect about the
quality of their perceptual experience. These metacognitive judgments are often quantified using
subjective ratings on confidence or visibility scales (Kanai et al., 2010; Maniscalco and Lau, 2012;
Yeung and Summerfield, 2012; Barrett et al., 2013). In most situations, metacognitive awareness
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is highly coupled with objective decision accuracy such that
when accuracy is high perceptual confidence is as well. However,
the phenomenon of blindsight, where individuals with damage
to primary visual cortex perform above-chance on visual
discrimination tasks despite reporting no visual experience,
provides compelling evidence that subjective and objective
measures of visual awareness can dissociate (Weiskrantz, 1986;
Cowey and Stoerig, 1991; Overgaard, 2011; Ko and Lau, 2012;
Leopold, 2012). This dissociation has proven useful for studying
visual awareness because it may unconfound basic perceptual
processes from metacognitive awareness (Rosenthal, 2000; Lau
and Rosenthal, 2011).
Attempts to induce blindsight-like phenomena in normal
observers have been controversial (Kolb and Braun, 1995;
Kunimoto et al., 2001), with initial observations proving
difficult to replicate (Morgan et al., 1997; Robichaud and
Stelmach, 2003). This difficulty stems, in part, from longstanding
complications with subjective reports, going back at least to
early criticisms of the introspectionist movement (see Comte
as quoted in James, 1890). Namely, it is difficult to prove
that observers are completely unaware of the stimulus that
they are accurately discriminating because their subjective
responses may be biased toward underreporting awareness. To
mitigate this issue, Lau and Passingham (2006) formulated a
paradigm to induce “relative blindsight” in healthy observers.
Relative blindsight refers to a comparison between two similar
stimulus conditions with comparable objective discrimination
accuracy, yet with differing levels of reported awareness. This
contrast effectively isolates relative changes in metacognitive
awareness, while controlling for task performance, attention,
and motivational confounds, which would presumably impact
objective accuracy as well (Morales et al., 2015). Furthermore,
this approach is less prone to across-subjects response bias
in subjective reports because metacognitive awareness is
manipulated within each individual (Peters et al., 2016).
Although it remains debated whether this approach, which relies
on an observer having metacognitive insight (i.e., reportable
access to their conscious experience), fully captures all that
is present in perceptual experience (Block, 2011; but see
Brown, 2014), the subjective feeling of knowing that one has
perceived a stimulus often accompanies our visual experience
and should be considered an important aspect of visual
consciousness.
We sought to use recently developed procedures for
generating stimuli that induce relative blindsight in a perceptual
two-choice discrimination task, and then use these same stimuli
in a working memory (WM) paradigm to test the role of
metacognitive awareness in WM maintenance. Two recent
reports have demonstrated that one’s perceptual confidence is
primarily influenced by the amount of evidence in favor of a
stimulus interpretation (e.g., the contrast of an oriented grating;
here referred to as “positive evidence”), whereas one’s perceptual
capacity (d′) relies on the relative amount of positive evidence
to evidence against that stimulus interpretation (i.e., the signal-
to-noise ratio; Zylberberg et al., 2012; Koizumi et al., 2015).
Therefore, manipulating the amount of positive evidence in a
stimulus while maintaining the ratio of positive evidence to noise
may serve as a robust paradigm for inducing relative blindsight
and assessing the relationship between metacognitive awareness
and WM.
Theories of consciousness and theories of WM have both
posited a close link between these two constructs (reviewed in
Soto and Silvanto, 2014). Several WM theorists have focused on
whether information maintained in WM is conscious or not, and
there is agreement that at least attended representations in WM
are consciously experienced (Oberauer, 2002; Baddeley, 2003;
Cowan, 2011). Empirical and theoretical work on consciousness
has focused instead on whether sensory information must be
consciously perceived before it can enter WM. The strongest
version of this claim is expressed in Global Workspace Theory,
which posits that neural activation to non-conscious stimuli is
relatively short lived and local and may only be maintained
over a delay if it becomes consciously available in the global
workspace (Dehaene and Naccache, 2001; Baars, 2003; Baars and
Franklin, 2003). This relationship has been further supported by
the observation that subjective visual awareness and some WM
processes may share overlapping neural structures in prefrontal
and parietal cortices (Naghavi and Nyberg, 2005; Lau and
Passingham, 2006; Cul et al., 2009; Fleming et al., 2010, 2014;
Rounis et al., 2010; Persaud et al., 2011; Bor and Seth, 2012; Ester
et al., 2015). If a stimulus is perceived with greater metacognitive
awareness, it may engage prefrontal and parietal regions to a
greater extent, result in sustained neural activity, and may then
be made available to WM and other executive functions.
Recent experiments, however, have challenged the claim that
metacognitive awareness is necessary for WM (Soto et al.,
2011; Bergström and Eriksson, 2014, 2015; Dutta et al., 2014).
Across multiple visibility manipulations (backward masking,
flash suppression, attentional blink), these authors observed
above-chance WM performance on trials for which stimuli
were rated as unseen. This line of work has recently been
criticized, however, on the basis that subjective reports may be
confounded with response bias (Samaha, 2015; Stein et al., 2016).
If some subjects are biased toward underreporting awareness
of the WM stimulus, then above-chance performance may be
due to a degraded, but nevertheless conscious representation
of the memoranda. To overcome this limitation, the current
study takes a different approach to the question of whether
metacognitive awareness is related to WM. Rather than taking the
lowest rating on a confidence or visibility scale to truly indicate
complete unawareness, we investigate whether relative variation
in perceptual confidence predicts variation in subsequent WM
performance. We use stimuli that induce relative blindsight
(defined from an initial perceptual task) in a WM paradigm to
isolate perceptual metacognitive changes while controlling for
performance confounds and mitigating across-subject response
bias. Our primary interest is in manipulating confidence
independently of perceptual discrimination in order to test
whether increasing metacognitive awareness, on its own, leads to
increased WM performance. Of secondary interest is examining
the effect that the perceptual confidence manipulation may
have on confidence reports given for WM-based judgments. If
the degree of subjective visual awareness determines the extent
to which WM representations can be maintained, then WM
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performance should improve for stimuli encoded with higher
perceptual confidence, controlling for perceptual capacity (d′). To
anticipate, we successfully induced relative blindsight and found
that, in contrast to this proposal, higher perceptual confidence
had no appreciable effect on WM performance.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Subjects
Fifteen subjects (9 female, mean age = 20.6 years, SD = 1.68)
from the University of Wisconsin-Madison community
participated in this experiment and received monetary
compensation. Sample size was determined based on a
power analysis of previously reported effect sizes from three
experiments using a nearly identical manipulation (Koizumi
et al., 2015). From these three experiments, we averaged the
required sample size needed to detect the effect of positive
evidence on confidence with 80% power. All subjects provided
written consent, reported normal or corrected-to-normal visual
acuity and color vision, and were blind to the hypothesis of the
experiment. The University of Wisconsin-Madison Institutional
Review Board approved the study.
Stimuli
Target stimuli were sinusoidal luminance gratings embedded
in random dot noise presented within a circular aperture (see
Figure 1A). Gratings subtended 2 degrees of visual angle (DVA),
had a spatial frequency of 1.5 cycles/DVA, a phase of zero,
and were rotated 45 or −45◦ from vertical. Noise consisted of
random black and white pixels. Michelson contrast (Michelson,
1927; defined as the luminance difference between the brightest
and dimmest pixel of the stimulus, divided by their sum) was
computed for both signal (the grating) and the noise. We use
the term positive evidence to refer to the contrast of the grating
signal and the term noise to refer to the contrast level of the noise.
Following Zylberberg et al. (2012) and Koizumi et al. (2015), who
found that, across multiple types of stimuli, perceptual confidence
was driven by the absolute value of positive evidence in favor of a
perceptual decision, whereas d′ was driven by the ratio of positive
to negative evidence/noise, we created two sets of grating stimuli
with differing levels of positive evidence (high or low) but with
equal ratios of positive evidence (signal) to noise (see Figure 1A).
The ratio of positive evidence to noise used for the high positive
evidence condition was first determined for each subject by an
adaptive staircase procedure (see Procedure). We then halved the
contrast of both positive evidence and noise to create the low
positive evidence condition while maintaining the same ratio of
positive evidence to noise.
Stimuli were presented on an iMac computer screen (52 cm
wide × 32.5 cm tall; 1920 × 1200 resolution; 60 Hz refresh
rate). Subjects viewed the screen from a chin rest at a distance
of 62 cm. Stimuli were generated and presented using the MGL
toolbox1 running in MATLAB 2015b (MathWorks, Natick, MA,
USA). Fixation (a light gray point, 0.08 DVA) was centered on
1http://gru.stanford.edu
FIGURE 1 | Manipulating perceptual metacognitive awareness
independently of discrimination accuracy. (A) High (pink) and low (blue)
positive evidence stimuli were constructed by manipulating the overall
contrast of a target grating embedded in noise, while maintaining the same
signal-to-noise contrast ratio. Following prior work (Zylberberg et al., 2012;
Koizumi et al., 2015), we anticipated the absolute level of positive evidence
(target contrast) to influence confidence, yet the ratio of positive evidence to
noise to dictate d′. Colors not shown on actual displays. (B) The perceptual
task completed at the beginning and end of the experiment required subjects
to make a two-choice discrimination (left or right) based on the tilt of the
grating and then rate their confidence on a 1–4 scale (low–high). (C) Average
d′ and confidence across both blocks of the perceptual task. Stimuli with
higher positive evidence were reliably judged with higher confidence, despite
no significant difference in d′ between conditions. (D) Effect of positive
evidence broken down by the proportion of trials each rating was used.
Decreasing positive evidence caused a significant decrease in “3” ratings, and
an increase in “1” ratings, suggesting a shift in the distribution of confidence
ratings. Asterisk indicates p < 0.05, ns denotes non-significant effect. Error
bars indicate 95% confidence intervals on the positive evidence effect.
the screen and stimuli were presented at fixation against a gray
screen background. When three gratings were presented on load
3 WM trials these appeared evenly spaced along a concentric path
around fixation, with each grating centered 1.25 DVA away from
fixation (see Figure 2A).
Procedure
Over the course of a single 1.5-h testing session, subjects
performed a staircase task, then a perceptual task, then a WM
task, and then more of the perceptual task (total of 670 trials).
For the perceptual task, subjects were instructed to report the
orientation (left or right) of a target grating and then rate
their confidence in their decision on a 1–4 scale (low–high).
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FIGURE 2 | Increased perceptual confidence does not translate to improved WM performance. (A) After completing the perceptual task in Figure 1,
subjects completed a WM task using the same high and low positive evidence stimuli from the perceptual task. Load (1 or 3) was manipulated across blocks and
subjects were asked to indicate whether a highly visible probe orientation matched or did not match the orientation of the sample grating that previously occupied
the same screen location 7 s prior. They then rated their confidence from 1 to 4 (low–high). This example is of a non-match trial. (B) Match/non-match d′ and
average confidence ratings as a function of load and positive evidence conditions. We observed significantly lower d′ and confidence on load 3 as compared to load
1 trials, but no effect of positive evidence on d′ or confidence, and no interaction with load. This suggests that greater perceptual confidence (Figure 1) did not lead
to better WM performance. White lines denote condition means and blue and pink lines represent individual subjects, error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals on
the positive evidence difference.
For the WM task, subjects indicated whether a highly visible
probe grating matched or did not match the orientation of the
target grating that previously occupied the same screen location
(see Figure 2A), followed by a confidence report. Task order
was as follows: first, each subject completed 110 trials of a
1-up, 3-down staircase procedure, controlled with the PEST
algorithm (Taylor and Creelman, 1967), intended to produce ∼
79% discrimination accuracy. During the staircase, the Michelson
contrast of the target grating was manipulated relative to noise
contrast, which was was set to 1 and did not change. The first
10 trials were considered practice and were non-adaptive with
highly visible gratings. Subjects rated confidence after each trial
during the staircase to become familiar with the scale but we did
not analyze these data. The contrast defined by averaging the
last 10 reversals of the staircase was used as the high positive
evidence condition and half this contrast value (and half the
noise contrast) defined the low positive evidence condition (see
Stimuli). Next, subjects completed 160 trials of a perceptual task
(shown in Figure 1B) wherein condition (low or high positive
evidence) and grating orientation (left or right) were randomly
determined (with replacement) on each trial. Following an inter-
trial interval of random duration between 300 and 500 ms,
the fixation point dimmed to warn subjects of the start of
the trial and 300 ms later the target grating appeared (for a
duration of 33 ms). This tasks was used to test whether we could
dissociate perceptual confidence from discrimination accuracy
(d′) and thus replicate Koizumi et al. (2015) with slightly different
stimuli.
After the perceptual task, subjects completed four blocks of a
match/non-match WM task using the same low and high positive
evidence stimuli. Each block was 60 trials long and subjects
either had to remember 1 (“load 1”) or 3 (“load 3”) orientations,
depending on the block. Because previous work has examined
the relationship between awareness and WM using only one or
two stimuli (e.g., Soto et al., 2011), we included load 3 trials
to assess whether subjective awareness may improve WM when
a greater number of items are to be maintained. Block order
was interleaved and counterbalanced across subjects. Within a
block, positive evidence condition and grating orientation were
randomly determined on each trial. For any given load 3 trials,
each of the 3 stimuli contained the same low or high positive
evidence, but their orientations were chosen randomly. On 50%
of trials, the probe grating matched the target grating; on the
remaining 50% of trials the probe grating was opposite the
orientation of the target (e.g., 45 or −45◦). Stimulus timing
was the same as in the perceptual task except that a 7-s delay
period elapsed prior to the onset of the probe grating, which was
displayed for 200 ms.
Following the four WM blocks, subjects completed another
160 trials of the perceptual task in order to better estimate
perceptual d′ and confidence across the entire experiment. Across
all tasks subjects were given unlimited time to respond and
were instructed to emphasize accuracy over speed of their
responses. Responses were made on a computer keyboard using
the left and right arrow keys to indicate grating orientation
or match/non-match decision (with the subject’s right hand),
and using numerical keys 1–4 to indicate confidence (with the
subject’s left hand).
Data Analysis
d′ was calculated separately for each positive evidence condition
(low and high) and for each task and WM load using the
standard signal detection theory (Stanislaw and Todorov, 1999):
d′ was computed as z(hit rate)–z(false alarm rate), and criterion
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(bias) was defined as −0.5 × (z(hit rate) + z(false alarm
rate)), where z denotes the inverse of the normal cumulative
distribution function. Confidence ratings were averaged across
each condition. Confidence and d′ were computed separately
for the first and second blocks of the perceptual task and were
averaged to provide an estimate most reflective of perception
across the entire experiment. Paired-sample t-tests were used to
assess the effect of positive evidence on d′ and confidence from
the perceptual task. Confidence and d′ from the WM task were
independently analyzed with a 2 (positive evidence: low or high)
by 2 (load: 1 or 3) repeated-measure ANOVA.
The manipulation of the amount of positive evidence was
intended to affect confidence while leaving discrimination
accuracy unaffected. However, establishing a null effect through
traditional statistical hypothesis testing is problematic because a
non-significant statistical test could indicate either no effect or a
lack of statistical power. Therefore, we planned to calculate Bayes
factors to evaluate the relationship between positive evidence
level and perceptual and WM d′, using a calculator freely available
online2. A Bayes factor is a ratio of the evidences supporting
two different hypotheses, both of which must be defined. The
first hypothesis to be compared is the null hypothesis, that the
effect of positive evidence on discrimination accuracy is precisely
zero. To define the alternative hypothesis, we looked to Koizumi
et al. (2015), who used very similar stimuli and analyses to the
present study. In their Experiment 2a, there was a significant
interaction between positive evidence and task difficulty, driven
by the effect of positive evidence on d′ in the “difficult” condition.
We reasoned that if we were to see any non-zero effect of positive
evidence on perceptual d′ or WM d′ in our study, it might
be of similar magnitude to that seen in Koizumi et al. (2015).
Therefore, we defined the alternative hypothesis with a normal
distribution centered at the value from Koizumi et al. (2015),
with a standard deviation set to one half the mean so that the
distribution would not substantially include values below zero
(which would be in the opposite direction of the predicted effect,
per Dienes, 2014). We calculated the Bayes factor as the ratio of
evidence for the alternative hypothesis to the evidence supporting
the null hypothesis, so that values less than one favor the null
hypothesis and values greater than one favor the alternative
hypothesis.
Although subjects were instructed to prioritize accuracy over
speed of their responses, we also analyzed response times (RTs)
to assess whether manipulating positive evidence impacted a
metric of performance that may be sensitive to different aspects
of processing than d′. Trials with RTs exceeding ± 3 SD of
the mean of each condition were excluded and RTs were log-
transformed, prior to averaging across trials, to adjust for the
strong positive skew of the data. (Note that we report mean
RTs prior to log-transformation for ease of interpretation.) We
additionally analyzed median RTs. Paired-sample t-tests were
used to compare the effects of evidence on RTs during the
perceptual task and a 2 (positive evidence: low or high) by 2 (load:
1 or 3) repeated-measure ANOVA was used on RTs from the WM
task.
2http://www.lifesci.sussex.ac.uk/home/Zoltan_Dienes/inference/Bayes.htm
RESULTS
Perceptual Task
In line with prior findings (Zylberberg et al., 2012; Koizumi
et al., 2015), we observed significantly higher confidence ratings
for stimuli with high, as compared to low positive evidence
[t(1,14) = 3.07, p = 0.008], yet we detect no reliable difference
in d′ [t(1,14) = 0.95, p = 0.36; see Figure 1C]. The Bayes factor
for the effect of positive evidence on d′ was 0.11, favoring the
interpretation that the non-significant p-value is truly due to
a null effect (specifically, this indicates that the null is 9 times
more likely than the alternative). Analysis of RTs revealed a
reliable effect of positive evidence [t(1,14) = 7.24, p < 0.001;
Mlow = 908 ± 65 ms, Mhigh = 877 ± 64 ms], indicating faster
responses for stimuli with high positive evidence, mirroring with
the effects of positive evidence on confidence. This relationship
was observed when using median RTs as well [t(1,14) = 5.04,
p < 0.001]. Analysis of criteria showed no differences between
high and low positive evidence [t(1,14) = 0.57, p = 0.572],
suggesting that subjects were not reliably more biased toward
responding with a particular orientation as a function of positive
evidence.
To better understand how the average difference in perceptual
confidence that we observed translates to subjects’ use of the
confidence scale, we analyzed the proportion of trials on which
each confidence rating was used as a function of the level of
positive evidence (see Figure 1D). Paired-sample t-tests at each
confidence level indicate that reducing positive evidence led to a
reduced frequency of “3” responses and an increased frequency
of “1” responses (p-value per confidence rating: pconf1 = 0.024,
pconf2 = 0.41, pconf3 = 0.044, pconf4 = 0.11). This suggests that
low positive evidence was associated with a leftward shift of the
distribution of confidence scores, resulting in reliable pairwise
changes at levels 3 and 1. Together, these results indicate that
our stimuli reliably induced relative blindsight. On the basis of
these findings, we use these stimuli to make inferences about the
role of metacognitive awareness in WM, assuming comparable
perceptual encoding of the same stimuli during WM.
Working Memory Task
The ANOVA on WM d′ revealed a significant main effect of load
[F(1,14) = 6.04, p = 0.027], indicating worse performance on
load 3 compared to load 1 trials. Of primary relevance to our
study, we did not observed a significant main effect of positive
evidence on WM d′ [F(1,14)= 1.78, p= 0.203] or an interaction
of positive evidence with load [F(1,14) = 0.54, p = 0.472].
Further, for load 1 WM trials, which are most analogous to the
perceptual task in that only a single stimulus was displayed, mean
d′ was virtually identical on high (M = 1.32) and low (M = 1.33)
positive evidence trials [t(1,14) = 0.04, p = 0.97]. The paired
contrast at load 3 trials was also non-significant [t(1,14) = 1.45,
p = 0.167]. These non-significant results were supported to
different degrees by the corresponding Bayes factors. At load 1,
the Bayes factor was 0.10, indicating strong evidence for the null
hypothesis (specifically, that the null is 10 times more likely than
the alternative). At load 3, the Bayes factor was 0.48, indicating a
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more marginal level of evidence that nonetheless still favors the
null hypothesis, by a factor of 2, over the alternative. Together,
these results suggest that higher positive evidence, which gave rise
to more confident perceptual decisions, did not lead to improved
WM performance on either load 1 or load 3 trials (see Figure 2A).
The analysis of WM confidence showed a significant main
effect of load [F(1,14)= 5.08, p= 0.040], indicating that subjects
reported lower confidence on load 3 trials, mirroring the effect
of load on d′. In contrast to the effect of positive evidence
on confidence during the perceptual task, however, we did not
observe a significant main effect of positive evidence on WM
confidence [F(1,14) = 2.35, p = 0.14], although confidence
tended to be higher for high positive evidence (Mload1 = 2.67,
Mload3 = 2.37), than for low positive evidence (Mload1 = 2.62,
Mload3 = 2.35; see Figure 2B). RTs followed this same pattern,
showing a main effect of load [F(1,14) = 26.42, p < 0.001;
MlowLoad1 = 1628 ± 104 ms; MhighLoad1 = 1589 ± 82 ms,
MlowLoad3 = 2094 ± 99 ms, MhighLoad3 = 1987 ± 91 ms],
but no main effect of evidence (p = 0.17) and no interaction
(p = 0.31). Using median RTs revealed the same pattern, with
a significant effect of load [F(1,14) = 31.35, p < 0.001], but a
non-significant effect of evidence (p = 0.53) and no interaction
(p = 0.63). The analysis of criteria revealed no main effects or
interactions (all p-values > 0.28), indicating that neither load
nor amount of positive evidence reliably biased subjects toward
a certain response (i.e., match or non-match). Removing a single
subject who performed at chance on load 1 WM high positive
evidence trials did not change the significance of any of the above-
mentioned results. Together, these results suggest that perceptual
confidence had no influence on either WM accuracy or reaction
time.
DISCUSSION
The aim of the present study was to test whether manipulating
subjective confidence ratings independently of perceptual
discrimination capacity leads to comparable changes in how well
information is maintained in WM. In line with previous work
(Zylberberg et al., 2012; Koizumi et al., 2015), we found that
perceptual confidence depended on the amount of evidence in
favor of a perceptual decision, yet discrimination accuracy was
driven by the ratio of positive evidence to noise (see Figure 1).
This result confirmed that our stimuli produced different levels
of perceptual confidence, but comparable d′. We then used the
same stimuli as the memoranda in a WM task. Surprisingly,
stimuli that were perceptually encoded with greater subjective
confidence were neither better maintained over a 7-s delay
period, nor was RT speeded, irrespective of WM load. These
results challenge the claim that the degree of conscious perception
influences the extent to which information gains access to WM
(Dehaene and Naccache, 2001; Baars, 2003; Baars and Franklin,
2003). More generally, this finding is in line with recent work
suggesting that many high-level cognitive control functions, such
as task preparation and response inhibition may be independent
of metacognitive awareness (Lau and Passingham, 2007; van
Gaal et al., 2008, 2010; Koizumi et al., 2015). This is perhaps
surprising given that similar frontal structures are associated with
cognitive control, WM, and metacognitive awareness (Naghavi
and Nyberg, 2005; Cul et al., 2009; Persaud et al., 2011; Bor and
Seth, 2012; Fleming and Dolan, 2012; Miller and Buschman, 2013;
Ester et al., 2015).
A possible explanation for our finding that perceptual
confidence did not improve WM maintenance is that, whereas
metacognitive awareness may depend on frontal cortex (Cul
et al., 2009; Rounis et al., 2010), visual WM maintenance may be
subserved principally by sensory regions (Serences et al., 2009;
Riggall and Postle, 2012; LaRocque et al., 2014; D’Esposito and
Postle, 2015). Thus, WM may only benefit from metacognitive
awareness when operations involving frontal cortex are required.
This is in line with a recent experiment (Maniscalco and Lau,
2015) that showed that WM for letter strings interfered with
metacognitive sensitivity during a concurrent perceptual task
only when demanding mental manipulation of the letters was
required (when subjects had to alphabetize them). Because
manipulation of information in WM may depend on frontal
activity (Petrides and Milner, 1982; Petrides, 1995; D’Esposito
et al., 1999; Postle, 2005), it is plausible that WM would
be improved by initial perceptual confidence when a task
requires WM manipulation. This remains to be tested. Simple
maintenance, however, as required by our task, does not seem to
benefit from perceptual metacognitive awareness.
As the logic of our design rests on the assumption that the
perceptual experience underlying the confidence judgments in
the perceptual task is comparable to the perceptual experience of
the stimulus during the WM task, it is interesting that confidence
ratings made during the WM task did not reliably change as a
function of positive evidence. This suggests that, perhaps for our
stimuli, the positive evidence manipulation does not effectively
dissociate WM confidence from WM d′, as it does perceptual
confidence from perceptual d′. Interestingly, this pattern of
confidence across the two tasks was mirrored in RTs. Subjects
were faster to respond to stimuli with high positive evidence in
the perceptual task, but not in the WM task. This is consistent
with longstanding proposals that confidence judgments are an
inverse linear function of RTs (Volkmann, 1934), and further
supports a distinction between perceptual-based and WM-based
confidence reports. Several recent experiments have proposed
that distinct metacognitive systems and behavior may exist
for perceptual as compared to memory-based judgments, with
memory-based metacognition sometimes being more accurate
(Fleming et al., 2014) and relating more to parietal structures,
as compared to perceptual metacognition, which may be more
strongly associated with anterior frontal structures (Baird et al.,
2013; McCurdy et al., 2013; Fleming et al., 2014). This may also
relate to the observation that, in the present data, confidence
ratings tended to be higher overall during the WM task.
This is possibly due to having additional deliberation time
(i.e., the delay period) during which to form a confidence
judgment. Although we cannot be absolutely certain that subjects’
perceptual experience of the same stimulus was equivalent across
our two tasks, we believe that differences between tasks, which
could entail different mechanisms of making a metacognitive
judgment, is the most likely reason why our manipulation of
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positive evidence affected perceptual confidence, but not WM-
based confidence.
Finally, as our task was designed to assess the impact
of perceptual confidence on the passage of information into
WM, it remains unclear how consciousness is involved when
stimuli are already in WM. Many theories propose that
information in WM is consciously represented so long as
it is in the focus of attention (Oberauer, 2002; Baddeley,
2003; Cowan, 2011), while others propose that attentional
state changes alone cannot account for certain differences
between WM information content and the way that WM
content is experienced or introspected upon (Jacob et al., 2015;
Jacobs and Silvanto, 2015). In this respect, maintenance of
the stimuli in our task may transpire through a conscious
representation of an initial perceptual decision or guess. Future
work will need to probe metacognitive awareness during
maintenance to understand how WM content is experienced.
Nevertheless, insofar as perceptual metacognition is reflective
of conscious experience, our results challenge the notion
that visual awareness influences subsequent WM performance.
We do so using a paradigm that is less influenced by
response bias, and controls for perceptual capacity confounds.
Furthermore, we validate the relative blindsight paradigm
introduced by Koizumi et al. (2015) as a robust paradigm
for selectively manipulating perceptual metacognition in order
to provide insight into the behavioral consequences of visual
awareness.
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